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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the promises and pitfalls associated with Insurtech – the anticipated 
innovations in the insurance industry associated with social media marketing, artificial 
intelligence, big data analytics and more – and focuses in particular on the new methods of 
pricing and premium setting that are claimed to follow from the availability of self-tracking 
technologies and new volumes of customer data. Using the examples of telematics data in car 
insurance, efforts by health insurers to incentivize health behaviours (for example through the 
use of fitness trackers), and insurance companies’ own marketing materials, we assess the 
current state of play in the field of ‘personalized’ insurance pricing, pointing to obstacles as 
well as opportunities associated with its development. We then set these contemporary 
developments against a longer history of insurance pricing, understood as a history of 
arranging and classifying objects and persons for the purposes of calculating risk. We show 
that in its longer history, insurance reflected but also contributed to uncertainties about the 
distinction between persons and property. Drawing these two strands together, we conclude 
by assessing the implications of insurtech for future understandings of personhood. While 
there is scope for new categories of personhood to emerge, we show that there are also 
important continuities between past and present in terms of the challenge of bringing persons, 
parts of persons, material objects and pecuniary interests into successful alignment. 
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I want us to go for that insurance policy. 
- Ed: What insurance policy?  
The double indemnity. The one Jill’s selling. She’s, um, convinced me. 
- Ed: You saw her? –  
We had coffee together. 
- Ed: When?  
Well, you were so unfriendly to her, I thought I should make up for it. 
- Ed: What did she say? –  
Oh, just stuff. About the policy. About her. I like her. 
- Ed: She’s just a Jill hard-selling insurance. 
Oh, I think she’s more than that, Ed. Don’t you? 
https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-show=philip-k-
dicks-electric-dreams-2017&episode=s01e04 
 
Introduction 
Double indemnity, as all noir devotees know, is a clause – rich in moral hazard – whereby a 
life insurer promises to pay out double in the case of accidental death. The extract above is 
from a 2017 dramatization of the Philip K Dick short story ‘Crazy Diamond’1. The script 
twists another loop into the noir premise because Jill, the femme fatale character, is not just 
any old Jill, she is a Jill, a non-human endowed with a limited life-force ‘Quantum 
Consciousness’. Jill’s ruse is to tempt Ed to steal a Quantum Consciousness to re-endow her 
failing one while getting his wife to sign up for a contract that will double indemnify his life, 
a life that will soon be threatened by the existence of the contract. The plot describes a world 
of cold technology entangled with warm sentiment confronting fragile, contingent futures. 
The resulting dystopian Philip K Dick pastiche is nearly indecipherable, but peer at it long 
enough, with soft, half-closed eyes, and the strangest thing in it is the arrangement of persons 
and objects in the insurance contract. This is a contract in which Jill, a non-human, acts as an 
insurance person while Ed, a human, is positioned as an insurance object. 
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Insurance history is replete with such strange arrangements. The objects insured - ships, 
houses, plate-glass, elevators, mobile phones, Cyd Charisse’s legs - are a cypher of value. 
What is it that, at the present time, has such value that the prospect of its future loss cannot be 
borne without some restorative mechanism? It is this question that brings the insurance 
mechanism into being. The generally accepted account locates the origins of insurance in the 
thirteenth century, among the many commercial innovations, from bills of exchange to 
double entry bookkeeping, of the Lombardy merchants (de Roover, 1945; Levy, 2012). 
Restoring the damage wrought to cargo and merchants by risicum maris, the perils of the sea, 
was almost certainly insurance’s first job.2 That the sea presented difficulties that could not 
always be avoided made the use case for something that could sort out the losses. The arcane 
insurance rules that were developed to govern this sorting are a reminder of how high the 
stakes in classificatory struggles run (Bowker and Star, 1999). Each insurance innovation 
invents some classification, some arrangement of objects and persons, to allow value, and 
value practices, to be standardised. In this paper, we explore how these classifications are 
expressed in insurance and its technologies. What entities, what aspects, elements or 
combinations of valued human beings and things are currently the targets of classification, 
and to what ends?  
Insurance technology has lately earned its own neologism. ‘Insurtech’ is cast as the 
coming disruptor of a huge, rich, unpopular and impersonal industry whose products are 
bought without enthusiasm or affection, often in response to legal or financial pressure, by 
customers whose brand loyalty is really just inertia. This is all set to change as the 
Schumpeterian gale of insurtech dislodges or transforms incumbents allowing insurance 
transactions to be ‘personalized’ through innovations in social media marketing, behavioural 
tracking, big data analysis, Artificial Intelligence, machine learning and more.3  
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Broadly speaking, personalization involves using data about an individual to tailor 
marketing strategies towards them (Arora et al. 2008). While the personalization of products, 
distribution and promotional offers is relatively uncontroversial, the same cannot be said of 
pricing. The slope of the demand curve indicates that some customers will be willing to pay 
more than others for the same product and historically, sellers have exploited this to charge 
different prices to different customers based on their prior relationships and knowledge of 
them. Pushed along by mass markets and consumer rights advocacy, however, standardised, 
displayed and transparent pricing became common from the early twentieth century onwards 
(Carrier, 1994; Moor & Lury, 2018). Still, market situations have persisted- and insurance is 
one of them - in which price is too complex or fluid to expose patterns in its variations. Such 
exceptions have been tolerated but the emergence of new techniques, including dynamic, 
surge and personalized pricing, that use new and sometimes opaque data points to set prices 
has created a new set of controversies. These controversies are shaped by broader debates 
about the privacy, security and surveillance of personal data in a context of datafication in 
which online quantified data, real-time tracking and predictive analysis promise, or threaten, 
to reshape social action (boyd & Crawford, 2012; van Dijck, 2014).  
Pricing structured by personal data has generated extensive commentary about the 
consequences for fairness and access (Schüll 2016; Lupton, 2016a, 2016b; O’Neill, 2016) – 
particularly to essential and financial services including insurance and credit – that arise 
under broad processes of datafication and personalization. Under these conditions new forms 
of selfhood or personhood are said to emerge (Schüll, 2016; Ruckenstein and Schüll, 2017; 
Lupton, 2013; 2016a; Moor and Lury 2018). Yet when the diversity and particularity of 
specifications of personhood are considered historically (for example by looking at the 
classificatory, material and historical practices of insurance), questions arise about how to 
think about change in an always contingent category. Relatedly, it is not always clear that the 
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term ‘personalization’ adequately captures the diversity, particularity, opacity and precarity 
of insurance pricing practices4. Not all forms of personalized pricing, for instance, use data 
that is all that personal, some are based on usage and some may be anonymous, as when an 
unknown shoppers lurks around a product on a website or a market stall provoking sellers to 
issue offers.  
In what follows we are concerned with how persons and objects are classified and 
arranged in insurance, and with how human agency is made to fit with existing and emerging 
industry techniques and measurement practices. We begin by describing a few recent 
ventures in insurtech. These ventures, notably the adoption of fitness-tracking techniques, are 
reconfiguring risk and responsibility in ways that appear about to personalize insurance 
transactions, but may not do so in quite the way intended. What insurtech is already doing, 
however, is testing how insurance treats and classifies persons and objects. Reviewing these 
classifications historically, the task of the following section, exposes the variety and 
contingency of forms of specification of who, or what, counts as a person, or as an object, 
under what circumstances and to what ends. What purposes does it serve to identify some 
individual humans, and not others, as an insurance ‘person’? This raises the rarefied question 
of what, exactly, the concept of person is referring to. Personalizing processes are assumed to 
be acting on a pre-existing, stable, complete, conscious, free human being – but is this true? 
We ask this not just because it's an appropriate question for a special issue on price, but 
because it goes to the heart of debates about what personalization in insurance specifically, 
and in marketing and pricing more generally, is about.  
The response-ability of Insurtech 
 
What is the right amount of human? It’s not zero, but it could be a lot lower than it is.  
Hugh Terry, Founder, Digital Insurer5 
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Insurtech is a clumsy portmanteau. It is harder to say than fintech, its better known sibling, 
and has a fading rival in the earlier alternative ‘insuretech’6. Names, definitions and 
classifications matter everywhere and in insurance they cause their own kind of trouble. 
There is insurance and there is assurance, terms separated by a technical distinction reserving 
insurance for events that might happen (fire), from assurance for events that will happen 
(death). Then there is life insurance that applies when death might occur, as in a given time 
frame. There is the fact that not all Anglophone territories use the term ‘assurance’ at all and 
those that do mix them up in practice. Beyond life insurance there is insurance on all sorts of 
objects, against all sorts of events but, for a global industry, there is surprisingly little 
agreement on what to call the types. What is known as general insurance in the UK, Australia 
and many parts of Africa and Asia, is called property and casualty insurance in the US and 
non-life insurance in the rest of Europe. In the UK, the word insurance invokes a commercial 
and privatised contract for mitigating risk but in other parts of Europe it could just as well 
refer to the contributory mechanism that socialises risk. Insurance might be defined as a legal 
contract, as an organised practice and as a political rationality. It is all of those things, but at 
the most basic level insurance is a technology, a technology for doing risk.7 Through 
insurance technology payment responsibility for the risks of illness, injury, death, accident, 
crime and so on can be spread across a defined group. 
If this is right, and insurance is always a technology, what does the new term 
designate? Insurtech is typically taken to refer to technology-driven innovation in insurance. 
More specifically, it is associated with the disruptive role accorded to actors originating from 
outside the sector, notably from the digital technology industries. Hyperbole surrounds 
insurtech start-ups modelled along Silicon Valley lines and particular data-driven innovations 
in products, processes and delivery models. Among the latter, the most established insurtech 
innovation is in car insurance, where telematics devices or ‘black boxes’ combining 
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telecommunication, wireless and vehicular technologies are used to monitor individual 
driving behaviour and price accordingly. These devices soften actuarial prices, which have 
historically used limited data points (usually driver age, gender, vehicle type, and licence 
penalty points) to assess the future cost of claims associated with particular groups of drivers. 
Actuarial pricing means that younger drivers face higher prices based on the claims history of 
the whole group8. Telematics policies use an alternative model to set premiums by 
augmenting these datapoints with individual driver data including vehicle location, speed and 
behaviours like acceleration and braking.  
These policies are an emblematic example of individualised or personalized insurance 
and they have set the terms for the debate about insurtech. By provoking concerns about 
discriminatory surveillance, covert commercial control and the delegation of human 
responsibility to objects, black boxes seem to portend a profound change in the relationship 
between insurance and technology. Yet the character of that change cannot easily be derived 
from the relationships between people and objects that arise in telematics. For one thing, 
price personalization is not a straightforward proposition for an industry that is reputation 
sensitive, heavily regulated and built around the classification of group risks (Minty, 2018). 
As Swedloff puts it ‘insurers set prices by predicting the probability that any group of 
observationally identical individuals will suffer a loss … [they] individuate those prices by 
determining whether the particular observable characteristics of a particular insured correlate 
with particular harms’ (2014: 4).  
But the telematics narrative also risks distracting from the range and peculiarity of 
person/object relations embedded in insurance. In keeping with its origins navigating sea 
risks, insurance has a watery resistance to fixed definition. It always applies technologies to 
classify and distribute risks and responsibilities across persons, objects, properties, even God, 
but beyond that lies a whole atlas of variations. Insurtech is not about insurance engaging 
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with technology, it’s about an encounter with outsider technologies, technologies that were 
not developed with insurance in mind but threaten as with the hotel and taxi industries to 
‘uberize’ the sector9. This is an historic break that expands the atlas way beyond the new 
structure introduced in telematics policies. Insurance firms were close partners in the 
development of information processing technologies (Yates, 2005; Campbell-Kelly, 1992) 
and before that in the development of all sorts of mercantile instruments. Insurtech turns on 
an encounter with the digital technology industries, with products, platforms and processes 
that were designed with something else entirely in mind. This takes insurance imaginaries 
into distant territories, territories in which even science fantasies or speculative fabulations 
(Haraway, 2016) involving non-humans plotting double indemnity fraud, are worth 
considering. 
This may seem far-fetched, but insurtech is embarking on a series of projects that seem 
speculative or fantastical partly because they introduce new distributions of risks and 
responsibilities between persons and objects. These are distributions that query who, or what, 
is the bearer of responsibility, who or what is positioned as ‘response-able’ in future 
contingents. More precisely, they raise the question about the locus of nominally ‘human’ 
capacities for instance consciousness, self-representation and reflectiveness (c.f. Hirst and 
Woolley, 1982). Consider for example the following scenarios. Telematics devices can detect 
a wide range of driver behaviours including phone use and alcohol levels that are identified 
risk factors. The US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has trialled a Driver 
Alcohol Detection System for Safety that will prevent a car from starting if it detects the 
driver is over the limit10. If insurers adopt these features it will create interesting questions 
about responsibility in the event of the technology failing (for instance, by not detecting a 
drunk driver or recording a false positive and preventing an urgent trip).  
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The use of telematics data in car insurance premium setting has also provoked concerns 
that self-tracking health apps and devices are being, or soon will be, used to similar effect in 
health and life insurance.11 The proliferation of data available from genomes, the self-
tracking of sleep, exercise and diet patterns, is taken to mean that insurers ‘will increasingly 
calculate risk for the individual and free themselves from the generalities of the larger pool’ 
setting premiums accordingly (O’Neill, 2015: xx; Lupton 2016b). Given the increasing 
prominence of insurance schemes that offer incentives to policyholders using fitness-tracking 
devices this seems a reasonable conclusion to draw. The South African insurance company 
Discovery has been incentivising healthy behaviours since the 1990s (French and Kneale, 
2009) through a variety of rewards, for example cinema tickets, discounted food and gym 
membership. More recently, under the brand Vitality, which is traded in the UK and US, it 
has begun to offer Apple watches at heavily discounted rates to customers who meet monthly 
‘activity points’ targets. Oscar Health, a start-up launched in the US to trade in the new 
marketplaces set up in 2014 as part of the Affordable Care Act (or Obamacare), offered 
members free Misfit fitness trackers with the incentive of Amazon gift card dollars for those 
who met individualized, algorithmically determined, step targets. 
On the face of it, these schemes imply a discriminatory financialization of personal 
habits. ‘What if’ Forbes’ Steven Bertoni (2014) asked, ‘thanks to wearables, health insurance 
began to work like car insurance where every health infraction (say a bar bender, 
Thanksgiving feast or sedentary Sunday of Netflix binge) hurt your health score and rocketed 
your health premiums?’ But a few leaps are being made here. Vitality and Oscar Health offer 
rewards and incentives for consumption in a way that parallels retailer loyalty schemes. 
Offering bonuses or rewards to those who reach fitness targets clearly influences price but 
that is not the same as using self-tracking data to assess and price individual risk. The latter is 
fraught with practical, regulatory and reputational obstacles (Arentz and Rehm, 2016; 
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McFall, 2017; Minty, 2017). Insurance is a closely regulated field with a patchwork of legal 
and voluntary prohibitions limiting the types of personal data that can be used to price risk. In 
addition, while driving habits have a measurable and therefore, in Knightian terms, priceable 
relationship to accident (Knight, 1921), the relationship between the number of steps taken 
and overall health risk is highly uncertain. Determining health risk at an individual, rather 
than a population level is near guesswork – there will always be random 100 year old 
smokers (Davey Smith, 2011) and the clinical evidence to support the health benefits of self-
tracking is patchy (Neff and Nafus, 2016). In a competitive field, companies are also 
protective of their brands and cautious about any reputational damage that could arise from 
being associated with uses of personal data that might be seen to discriminate against legally 
protected characteristics.12 For those reasons, self-tracking devices, unlike telematics devices, 
have not been transformed into insurable risk bearing objects. 
Brands matter a great deal in insurance. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
brands were built to convey solidity, respectability and a flash of mythology –amidst the 
Prudential, Equitable, Provident virtues there were Phoenix, Pelicans, Pearls and Rocks. By 
the twenty-first century brands were corporate, consolidated and much less lively in a market 
context distinguished by low levels of brand differentiation and customer trust. The path to 
the present can be traced backwards through an example like Aviva, the largest British 
multinational general and life insurer. Aviva was chosen in 2002 as the new name for a 
company formed from the merger of Norwich Union, Commercial Union and General 
Accident and over 100 other companies named after lions, oceans, planets, professions and 
places all the way back to the earliest, the Hand in Hand Fire and Life formed in 1696. Aviva 
is a palindrome based on the Latin for alive. It was meant to sound memorable, snappy and 
global but it entered a conglomerate lexicon of equally forgettable names. Like other major 
insurers, Aviva commissions research to inform its branding and product development 
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strategies. One of its most recent reactions to this undifferentiated landscape is a product 
called ‘Ask it never’ which aims to provide quotes without asking customers any questions 
relying instead on digital footprint data to underwrite the risk being presented (Minty 
2017b)13. 
 ‘Ask it never’ is one of many data-driven underwriting innovations. Another, 
SelfieQuote.com, is the result of a collaboration between Legal and General America (LGA) 
and a science and technology company, Lapetus Solutions Inc14. Customers upload a selfie 
and Lapetus’ facial analytics technology analyses age, gender and BMI to inform LGA’s 
indicative quote. Both Aviva’s Ask it Never and LGA’s selfie.quote.com summon a different 
looking insurance world in which risk can be assessed from opaque footprint or jpeg data. 
Digital technologies here appear to take the place of lively ‘human’ capacities for 
determining risk and responsibility. Yet the initial quotes in both cases are followed up with 
more traditional underwriting questions. There is insurtech innovation here, but much of it is 
in promotion and presentation. SelfieQuote.com and Ask it Never look different, livelier; 
characteristics they share with many other insurtech start-ups. Oscar is another case in point. 
The company’s strongest distinction is not the self-tracking feature but its brand. The 
company was named after founder Joshua Kushner’s great-grandfather in an overt effort to 
differentiate and humanise the brand that is expressed across its ‘HiOscar.com’ url, its 
product packaging, cartoon advertising and Apple-esque office design. Across the insurtech 
landscape the names – Lemonade, Bought-by-Many, Spixii, Brolly, InMyBag – are quirkier, 
friendlier – more human. These are brands designed with personalities. If anything, it is 
brands, not prices, that are being ‘personalized’ here. The direction of travel may seem to be 
towards the distribution of more person-like qualities for calculating, transacting, and 
assessing risk onto technologies and objects, but as we show in the next section, that route is 
more crooked than straight.  
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‘Am I not a man and a brother?’ ‘Am I not a woman and a sister?’ On 
property and persons in insurance 
These quotations are recognisable as the mottos of the British abolitionist movement of the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. They were embossed above Josiah 
Wedgewood’s image of a supplicant, kneeling slave on numerous pottery plates, brooches 
and medallions and credited with swaying the public and political argument for abolition first 
in Britain, and later in the United States where a printed rendition of a kneeling, enslaved 
woman circulated widely. In their double signalling, as political and as brand advertisements, 
the tokens are uncomfortable commemoratives, marking the actions of abolitionist reformers 
over those depicted as passively enslaved. The tokens, and the brutal history they hint at, is 
familiar enough. Less familiar are some of the legal, financial and commercial arrangements 
that made the slave trade viable. Insurance has its own distinctive place in this history as can 
still be discerned in how its terminology and classifications emerged and were put to use. 
Developing a mechanism to repair losses at sea likely defined insurance’s first purposes 
but the traceable history of marine finance instruments from around the thirteenth century is 
messy. There is a period of overlap between sea loans, in which a seagoing merchant takes a 
loan from a land-borne merchant to cover losses if the vessel fails to reach its destination 
intact, and marine insurance proper, in which the seagoing merchant, ‘the insured’, pays a 
premium to the land-borne merchant, ‘the insurer’, who in return agrees to pay out a given 
sum in the event of a disaster at sea. The latter format, with ‘stereotyped’ policies and 
terminology was settled by the fifteenth century and changed little for over three hundred 
years (de Roover, 1945: 198). During the same period, the structure of mercantilism changed. 
A system of trade conducted through chains of agents and partners emerged and cargoes 
sailed with captains rather than merchants. ‘Difficulties to avoid in the sea’, risicum maris 
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were transformed into risk or risque, an object and a form of private property, that was 
isolated from physical goods and could be traded independently from those same goods. 
This maritime history is the root that connects risk practices to nineteenth century 
liberal notions of self-directing, free persons (Poovey, 1998; McFall, 2007; Levy 2012). 
Marine insurance was designed to compensate financial losses incurred when a merchant’s 
cargo never made it to its destination. This might imply that insurance in this period was 
primarily addressed to covering things, objects or property, not persons or ‘lives’, but this is 
where insurance classification practices are murkiest. As Levy has it; ‘before men became the 
proprietors of “risks” on their own free selves, they first owned the “risks” on the bodies of 
their slaves’ (2012: 22). Insurance on slave cargoes dates back at least to the fifteenth century 
and it was, in terms of head count, the largest share of the nascent life insurance business 
even before the transatlantic slave system was developed (Clark, 2013). The business was so 
well established that by the time abolitionist arguments were being articulated in the late 
eighteenth century, insurance was part of a proliferation of commercial contracts that treated 
some human lives as commodities. Slave insurance has been read as a bizarre legal exception, 
a particular confusion between personhood and property in the course of defining how to 
insure persons. This doesn't hold, as Clark pointedly observes, because ‘as a legal matter and 
a social fact, individuals had long been construed as property’ (2010: 53). What marked out 
Atlantic slavery he argues, was not the confusion of the categories of person and property, 
but the ruthlessness of the system’s disregard of the norms that had formerly applied to legal 
relationships involving human property. 
This is clear in the catastrophic case of the Dutch ship, the Zong, that Clark discusses. 
The fate of the Zong’s human cargo memorialised in Turner’s famous painting of 1840 
‘Slavers Throwing Overboard the Dead and Dying, Typhoon Coming On’ records an event 
that took place almost sixty years earlier15. The Zong left Africa for the West Indies with 442 
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slaves on board. Disease broke out and by the time the ship reached the Caribbean more than 
60 slaves and 7 crew members were dead and many more were gravely ill. Faced with 
dangerously low supplies of drinking water, Luke Collingwood, the ship’s captain, claimed 
his order for 133 of the sickest slaves to be flung overboard was made only in an attempt to 
save those he could.  
What happened on board the Zong was a brutal expression of the terms of the slave 
insurance contract. Marine insurance policies on slaves excluded claims resulting from 
‘natural’ deaths on board but they admitted claims for those arising from an attempt to save 
the ship or its crew. When the case went to court Collingwood’s argument that his actions 
were motivated by a water shortage was undermined by his financial interests in a share of 
the profits if the ship completed its voyage - or, if it failed in an insurable way. Slaves dying 
in an emergency jettison were recoverable losses. For the purposes of insurance, the 
shipowner’s lawyer argued, slaves ‘are goods and property, whether right or wrong, we have 
nothing to do with it’ (quoted in Clark, 2010: 56). 
This argument was a calculated gloss on the entwined histories of insurance and slavery 
and the legal norms that existed to regulate the treatment of certain categories of persons as 
property. English law in the middle ages recognised an inalienable form of property in people 
who were not accorded the rights of fully, autonomous individuals but who were not quite 
chattels either (Clark, 2010). Wives, children, apprentices and servants were understood as a 
form of property for their masters but not a tradeable one. 
 
Although the common law did not support the buying and selling of persons, it did 
support the general principle that one person could own certain kinds of property in 
another. While commercial legislation simply opposed the class of persons, who by 
definition have certain rights, to the class of things, which by definition do not, the 
common law’s emphasis on status traditionally presented another, mixed category, that 
of a right-bearing subject who is also the property of another. (Michals, 1993: 201) 
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Clark (2010; 2013) elaborates the peculiarity of the norms governing property and persons 
through the case of insurance contracts issued on the lives of enslaved woman made pregnant 
by their owners or another man. These contracts appear to have been used to hedge against 
fines issued in late medieval Barcelona, Genoa and Rome on slaveowners for causing, or 
allowing, the pregnancy. Under some statutes the fines were issued, or the amount doubled, if 
the enslaved woman died during pregnancy or childbirth. The statutes convey a sense of the 
injury as a public affront to the hierarchies of social relations and property holding. In Clark’s 
reading ‘an enslaved woman’s death owing to pregnancy or childbirth represented the very 
worst outcome of a social and moral transgression’ (2010: 59).  
Such cases show how delicately the distinctions between property and persons were 
pinned in legal, commercial and specifically in insurance practices. This remained the case 
into the eighteenth century even as the patterns shifted and commercial life assurance began 
to settle into a more stable and regulated institutional form. One of the key moments in this 
long process of stabilisation was the 1774 Life Assurance Act. This Act was also known as 
The Gambling Act in a double naming that gives away the overlap in practice between 
insurance and speculation. Following the issue of a sequence of notorious insurance contracts 
made by third parties on the lives, and in one instance the sex, of others, over whom the 
insured had no pecuniary interest, European governments in France, Amsterdam, Genoa, 
Germany and the Netherlands prohibited insurance on lives (Murphy, 2010). In England, the 
Life Assurance Act attempted instead to temper the capacity of insurance to, as Clark has it, 
‘create property willy-nilly through a rarefied trade in abstract contingencies’ (2010: 68) by 
stipulating that an economic, ‘insurable’ interest be demonstrated by the contract’s proposer 
in the life named on the policy.  
Insurable interest requires that individuals have a reasonable expectation of pecuniary 
loss through the death of another person and that the sum assured is in line with that loss. It 
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curtailed the proliferation of morally hazardous contracts and was adopted widely. Insurable 
interest regularised some speculative insurance practices but not quite all. Policies were, for 
instance, auctioned to speculators on the legal technicality that insurable interest only had to 
apply when the policy was issued, not if it was later traded (Murphy, 2010). Auctions were 
not the only tolerated exception. Another branch of the life business, known as industrial life 
assurance, disregarded insurable interest entirely.  
Industrial life assurance policies began to be sold, and weekly premiums collected, by 
agents working from door-to-door around the 1840s (McFall, 2014). By the end of the 
nineteenth century industrial companies were trading on a scale that dwarfed the business of 
the older ‘ordinary’ life assurance sector which catered for the middle and upper classes. 
Industrial business was targeted at the poor, the ‘industrious classes’, and was designed 
initially as a mechanism to restore expenses associated with the never distant contingency of 
a funeral in the family. This meant that the majority of policies were taken out on ‘lives of 
another’ – on husbands and wives but also on parents, children, aunts, uncles and 
grandparents - in whom the proposer might, or might not, have an insurable interest. The 
absence of insurable interest was quietly disregarded throughout the nineteenth century 
because of the small sums involved, in deference to the social importance of funeral 
provision and in tacit acknowledgement that these expenses might otherwise fall on the 
public purse. By 1910, the industry was colossal and clamouring for a correction to be made 
to grant legal standing to millions of policies. Over the coming decades, several laws 
attempted to retrospectively whitewash these policies. But legislators struggled to make law 
that recognised how industrial policies classified the variety of familial and object relations at 
play in financing funerals. They struggled to define the sums that might be commensurate 
with funeral costs and struggled even more to specify where the line should be drawn 
between direct burial costs and allowable expenses associated with wakes, mourning clothes, 
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travel, lost earnings etc. Even specifying the sort of relations between the proposer and the 
life assured that might be permissible as a special type of insurable interest was confounded 
by confusion surrounding cases of illegitimate, step, adoptive, foster and informal familial 
relations.  
Implicit in this was a deep uncertainty about whether the poor could really be specified 
as the free, conscious, self-governing persons of nineteenth century liberal thought. The 
disregard of insurable interest in industrial assurance was partly a consequence of this 
uncertainty. At the least, the economic contracts of the poor were regarded as different in 
kind and involving different sorts of relations. This is evidenced in the enduring hysteria over 
industrial assurance contracts taken on children’s lives (McFall, 2014a; Zelizer, 1981). For 
seventy years or more a connection was drawn, in the press, courts and parliament, between 
these policies and deliberate neglect or murder. The small sums at stake betray a persistent 
belief, in the absence of supporting evidence, that the poor did not possess the attributes 
necessary for self-government in market relations. They were regarded as particularly 
susceptible to moral hazard, a category of person for whom even a moderate financial 
incentive could lead to infanticide.  
These cases demonstrate the role the insurance trade in abstract contingencies played in 
creating a proliferation of property relations involving both persons and objects. Through 
such practices insurance companies were deeply implicated in the obscure geometry that 
defined who qualified as a person, who was an objectified form of property, and the sorts of 
relations that should persist between them. This capacity to articulate, define or summon 
particular concepts and attributes of the person is not unique to insurance but it is expressed 
within it. This raises questions about who, or what, ‘the person’, as the supposed foundation 
of the insurance contract means.  
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Who, or what, could insurtech be personalising then? Persons, markets and 
prices 
First, persons 
 
the idea of the person is an insurance policy. (Rorty, 1988: 31) 
 
This remark is part of philosopher Amelie Rorty’s dissection of the concept of person. Rorty 
insists that given the dramatic discontinuities in how persons have been characterised and 
rendered in moral and legal practices over time and across cultures there can really be no 
such thing. Human beings, as Marcel Mauss (1979) famously insisted, are specified in all 
societies but they are not necessarily individualised as ‘unique entities coincident with a 
distinct consciousness and will’ (Hirst and Woolley, 1982: 118). By describing the idea as an 
insurance policy, Rorty refers to the work people want the category to do; perhaps being a 
person secures certain rights, to be treated with regard, as rational, thinking, well intentioned 
beings. For John Dewey, person could mean ‘whatever the law makes it mean [ ...; it] might 
be used simply as a synonym for a right-and-duty-bearing unit. Any such unit would be a 
person’ (1926: 656). This, as the legal history of insurance demonstrates, does not mean that 
every human being lands in the category of person. ‘A slave has no juridical personality,’ US 
Justice Roger Taney ruled in 1857, and ‘therefore no right to recognition anywhere as a 
person before the law’ (Slaughter, 2014: 274).  
Thus far, we have been concerned with the variety of ideas about the person expressed 
in certain historical types of insurance. Not every human being under these insurance skies 
qualified as a person endowed with the sorts of attributes and characteristics commonly 
bundled under the concept. The person as ‘the author of their own acts and centred in a 
unitary, reflective and directive consciousness’ (du Gay, 2007: 21) most closely resembles 
two of the parties to the insurance contract: the insurer, whether an individual or a 
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corporation, and the insured, the individual proposing the contract. Other human lives, for 
example, the lives assured by the contract, might be limited forms of property. Prior to 1774, 
these individuals might have been unknown to the proposer, after 1774 they could still have 
been unaware of the sums assured under their names if they were poor, wives, children or 
other relatives insured under the ‘lives of another’ category in industrial assurance. 
These insurance cases mark how very particular, ‘all the way up and all the way down’, 
the contexts which define concepts of person are (Rorty, 1988: 8). Insurance practice was an 
active protagonist alongside legal, political and commercial systems in negotiating the 
attributes a ‘person’ should possess. Thinking about insurance practice in this way means 
taking a deeply contingent approach to concepts of the person, one which sees these concepts 
as the outcome, not the foundation, of social processes. Historically and anthropologically 
little can be taken for granted about the attributes that define ‘true’ persons. As Rorty 
explains, a society’s conception of agency is closely linked to the forms of action that are 
seen to ‘preserve or enhance that society’s conception of its proper survival and 
development’ (1998: 30). This means that the range of traits taken to define ‘persons’ 
inevitably change. Rorty maintains that societies set consequential ‘paradigm cases’ that 
define the range of agents rendered capable of responsible action whether ‘corporations, 
human beings, demon possessors, martians or dolphins’ (1998: 30). This is something that 
emerging insurtech technologies are already caught up in, for instance, in ongoing legal 
debates about the determination of responsibility for losses or accidents caused by vehicular 
telematics. Viewed this way, the distribution of person and property statuses among human 
and non-human individuals in insurance, maps onto the definition of responsible or 
‘response-able’ agency established in contemporaneous legal, financial and commercial 
arrangements.  
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This argument deserves closer sociological attention than it often gets. The idea that the 
concept of person has within it the essence of the normative, moral principles that must be 
defended against political, economic and technological upheaval is powerful. But if there is 
no single concept of person, it cannot settle disagreements and conflicts about competing 
values and priorities – or about the consequences of technological change. The social 
processes, notably here the legal, institutional and commercial rules that govern the operation 
of markets, have always been party to how persons are specified. If what we understand by 
the person is the outcome of a network of relations and attachments that includes the laws of 
markets, should that more actively inform how we think about the ways human users are 
‘transformed’ (Lupton, 2016a, 41) by the incorporation of digital devices? 
 
Second, markets  
Thus far, we have focused on the contingency of the identification and specification of 
persons and their attributes but what does this mean in the context of market practices? 
Patrick Aspers defines markets as social structures for the ‘exchange of rights in which offers 
are evaluated and priced, and compete with one another, which is shorthand for the fact that 
actors – individuals and firms – compete with one another via offers’ (2011: 4). Buyers and 
sellers face each other and constitute social structures that stabilise as markets over time 
through an accumulated material and practical history of transactions. This points to the role 
of particular, visible practices in configuring markets but it doesn’t cover one of the primary 
questions markets, particularly emerging, ‘disruptive’ markets, raise in practice. How do 
markets become markets, where do they get their persons from and what attributes and 
actions qualify an individual as a person for the purposes of markets?  
In the history of insurance selling, markets are often referred to as sources of 
‘prospects’ (McFall, 2014a). Prospects are groups of individuals that may share some 
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attribute, for example newly qualified drivers, new parents or owners of rare pets, that makes 
them susceptible to a particular sales approach, proposition or idea. These ‘markets’ are only 
prospective markets but that is what makes them interesting. To emerge, markets depend on 
recruiting new prospects to continually extend the chains or networks of relations that will 
make them durable. In his classic discussion of the path that led to the technological and mass 
market establishment of the Kodak camera in the nineteenth century, Latour concludes that ‘a 
chain of associations is more real than another if it is longer’ (1991: 118). Step by step, 
relation by relation, markets owe their existence and their survival to this extension. What 
this implies is not that markets must recruit whole, human individuals but rather that markets 
are involved in configuring certain sorts of attributes and practices that ‘make up’ persons as 
prospects, as regular customers, as disaffected ‘churned’ consumers etc. Markets, in other 
words, don’t need or want to see whole or individual persons; they want targetable group 
categories of customers configured from bits of personal data . 
As Hacking (1986) argued, there are instances in which identified, named categories of 
person seem to emerge synchronously, ‘hand in hand’, with the persons in them. Naming 
categories of person concerns how practices or behaviour at an individual level meet those of 
a community of experts. Hacking posits a framework in which this encounter involves two 
vectors pressing together to create a particular reality. Something similar is rendered in 
Foucault’s History of Sexuality, as two poles, the ‘anatomo-politics of the human body’ and 
the ‘biopolitics of population’ linked by ‘a whole cluster of intermediary relations’ (in 
Hacking, 1986: 169). This idea of a cluster of intermediary relations is vital to understanding 
the encounter that takes place between sellers and buyers. As Hacking acknowledges, the 
advertising industry is largely engaged in making-up people summoning what he calls our 
‘susceptibility’ for roles for which ‘we have no name’ (1986: 170).  
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What we are suggesting is that the enterprise of marketing, or more broadly, market 
making mobilises neither a whole person nor a susceptibility for roles, but a blur of attributes 
that in an unstable, reflexive loop specify us as persons. This is what Hennion, Meadel and 
Bowker (1989: 208) are getting at when they argue that we are already incorporated, ‘traced 
out’ within products by dint of the prolific series of intermediary techniques that constitute 
markets.  
 
Third, price personalization  
 
Now, with the evolution of data science and network computers, insurance is facing 
fundamental change. With ever more information available - including the data from 
our genomes, the patterns of our sleep, exercise, and diet, and the proficiency of our 
driving - insurers will increasingly calculate risk for the individual and free themselves 
from the generalities of the larger pool. (O’Neill, 2016: 164) 
 
Insurance companies are beginning to develop other ways of incorporating self-tracking 
data into the calculation of risks and resultant premiums offered to customers. (Lupton, 
2016b: 108) 
 
Personalization dynamics in marketing, particularly in pricing, have attracted a lot of 
attention. Market personalization is one of the more visible outcomes of the combinations of 
new technologies, correlative analysis techniques and mythologies that define ‘big data’, 
notably through the use of transactional and purchase histories to make personalized 
recommendations and offers (boyd and Crawford, 2012; Vargha, 2017; Moor and Lury 
2018). This has led numerous authors to raise questions about who is getting access to what 
data, what sorts of analyses are being conducted and with what effects on different groups 
and individuals (Schüll 2016; Lupton, 2013, 2016a, 2016b; Neff and Nafus, 2016; O’Neill, 
2016; Pasquale, 2016). In the case of insurance, the risk that datafied personalization could 
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also mean targeting, discrimination and exclusion of minority and ‘underserved’ groups is 
hardly the stuff of dystopian fantasy for an industry based on the classification and 
assessment of risk groups (Bouk, 2015; Swedloff, 2015). The use of big data to inform what 
the industry refers to as ‘price optimisation’ has attracted the attention of regulators in several 
US states and is currently part of a Financial Conduct Authority review in the UK.16 It is 
nevertheless premature empirically to conclude that insurance companies are rushing toward 
personalized risk pricing (Lupton 2013; 2016; O’Neill, 2016).  
The associated claim that datafied, surveillant or ‘dataveillant’ (Ruckenstein and 
Schüll, 2017) personalization in insurance, as in consumer markets more generally, is 
creating a new, ‘database self whose truth lies in scattered points, association and dynamic 
accretions’ (Schüll, 2016: 11), ‘sliced and diced into decontextualized parts, and bought and 
sold’, (Nafus & Neff 2016: 62) foregrounds this emergent self. The credit reporting agency 
Experian has made the ‘data self’ the focus of its 2018 advertising campaign and visiting 
almost any website, including those of academic publishers, produces a slew of personalized 
recommendations that can follow you all over the internet17. It is almost impossible to avoid 
being confronted with representations of our selves, our pasts, our preferences hastily 
assembled from data traces. If, as we have suggested, the traits and attributes that combine to 
specify persons are the outcomes of a network of relations and attachments, then datafied 
personalization practices are clearly involved in this business. There is however a danger that 
foregrounding a new ‘sliced, diced’ database self obscures historical continuities in the way 
that markets configure only the bits and pieces of persons deemed relevant.  
Insurers have never classified or attached risk to whole human individuals. Instead, 
they have focused on defining qualities or attributes that qualify certain human beings as 
persons for insurance purposes. Hence, as we have seen, some human beings were 
categorised as persons, some as property, some as a mixture while some ‘persons’ could bear 
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legal, insurable responsibilities without being human. The recent foray of insurance into 
personalization schemes exposes a rather different but parallel disinterest in whole persons. 
As elsewhere in the market, existing personalizing strategies are not geared towards gaining 
deep knowledge about persons through the scrutiny of data collection and tracking 
technologies. Nor do these strategies require the revelation of pre-existing, but previously 
secret, parts of the self for the purposes of discrimination. It is a process by which new sets of 
relations between persons, parts of persons, material objects and pecuniary interests are 
established. These may, or may not, entail ‘discrimination’ against groups with legislatively 
protected characteristics18, but they almost all involve making classifying and grouping 
persons on the basis of identified attributes or behaviours. 
To explain what we mean, consider again the use of behavioural data in pricing. There 
are around 850,000 telematics based motor insurance policies in existence in the UK.19 The 
ability to track the driving habits of individuals, and to use this information to offer more 
variegated prices to members of riskier groups may be considered ‘actuarially fairer’ (Meyers 
& Van Hoyweghen, 2017) than pricing based on socio-demographically constituted groups of 
person. And yet the ‘personalization’ at work here does not entail a drilling down into the 
depths of the person. Instead, it creates a new type of interaction between the driver, the black 
box and the insurer, predicated on heightened visibility and self-awareness, such that the box 
performs a dynamic disciplining function on a driver whose pecuniary interests are brought 
into some kind of alignment with those of the insurer. Behavioural data from self-tracking in 
health and life insurance is different. Vitality and Oscar Health offer rewards and incentives 
to participating policyholders but the data is not used to set individual premiums. This doesn't 
mean these schemes are completely unconnected to pricing. Oscar and Vitality’s incentive 
schemes include promotional deals with companies like Amazon, Apple, Starbucks and 
Virgin and Nuffield gyms, all of which are more likely to appeal to younger and more active 
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groups with a lower probability of becoming ill. The benefits to the companies lie in 
attracting younger, fitter customers who are, after all, the main users of wearables (Neff and 
Nafus, 2016).  
Personalized targeting, as Moor and Lury (2018) argue, is never just personal; it 
involves generalisation and the production of ‘types of persons’. In insurance it runs very 
close to risk selection, which applies when insurers use marketing techniques to appeal to 
targeted groups.20 Covert risk selection applies where insurers are prohibited, for example 
from differential pricing on grounds of protected characteristics or health status, but there is 
nothing to prohibit the development of brand personalities like Oscar health insurance that 
are more likely to appeal to particular groups. Pricing and promotion co-depend and co-vary 
in marketing strategies in ways that make it hard to disentangle personalized promotions from 
personalized prices (Moor and Lury 2018). In addition, insurance pricing has to cover the 
projected costs of risks assumed, be set at a level that attracts sufficient numbers of the right 
sort of customers and be compliant with policy regulation. Even without the newly 
proliferating sources of personal data, insurance pricing is never simply derived from 
actuarial calculations of risk. It depends instead on an almost alchemical dexterity in 
combining socio-economic, managerial, accountancy, actuarial, clinical and scientific 
knowledges, figures and tools (Ericson et al. 2000; Van Hoyweghen 2014; Minty, 2017).  
Behavioural forms of personalization, such as those in telematics-enhanced car 
insurance, act on the person to shape behaviour. To explore this further, consider another 
instance of the data-intensive organization of markets to see what kinds of ‘persons’ the 
market produces when it is not apparently aimed at ‘doing personalization’. In recent years, 
energy providers in various countries have tried to make use of ‘live’, or regularly updated, 
prices in order to even out fluctuations in demand. This has typically been implemented with 
the help of in-home technologies – more black boxes – that show users changing prices 
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throughout the day, with the hope of incentivizing energy use when prices are lowest. Thus 
an attempt is made to orchestrate persons, behaviours, technologies and pecuniary interests. 
Such activities are not typically considered as price personalization, however, since they do 
not set prices based on known characteristics of individual users. If ‘the person’ is understood 
as an entity with fixed but potentially knowable characteristics, as well as some kind of 
interiority or personal depth, then that person is protected from scrutiny under this market 
arrangement. And yet, like more obviously personalized insurance arrangements, it seeks to 
act on the person and to mobilize certain kinds of behaviour. Moreover it is not clear that this 
arrangement is ‘fairer’ than one in which aspects of the user are known through data. After 
all, the ability to respond to fluctuating energy prices, and therefore to take advantages of 
lower costs at certain times of the day, is limited in ways that are clearly linked to aspects of 
the person (for example their job or employment status) but over which that person may have 
very little control. Prices still adhere to persons (or ‘personal situations’); the difference is 
that here the person cannot realistically do anything to change them. 
In fact, by focusing on the possibility of using ‘deep’, data-driven, knowledge of the 
person to engage in price discrimination, critics of personalization may inadvertently conflate 
different aspects of the datafication of markets that might benefit from being treated 
separately. With regard to fairness, for example, the argument that price personalization 
should not lead to poorer people being excluded from offers, or charged more than wealthier 
people, makes sense to many. But reversing the argument, to allow wealthier people to be 
charged more, and poorer people less, involves a different notion of fairness. Since the 
economic logic of price discrimination is to find and extract the maximum that a given 
consumer is willing or able to pay; this may in principle benefit poorer consumers, by giving 
them access to more affordable products and services rather than being effectively excluded 
by fixed prices. Such an understanding of fairness would, however, be a highly novel one in 
 27 
most markets, organized as they are around unspoken principles by which market equality 
and fairness (in theory if not in practice) means the same price for all.   
The second issue raised by datafication relates to what institutions ought to be able to 
know about users, and whether this should depend on factors such as how information is 
gathered and used. One question is whether people might be willing – or indeed should be 
allowed – to reveal aspects of their personal identity that could benefit them financially. This 
issue can overlap with the question of fairness in cases where disclosure of ‘personal’ 
information might benefit historically disadvantaged groups. The case of insurance is again 
instructive here, since women drivers are actuarially determined to be safer, and this has led 
to preferential premium pricing. Such deals have been outlawed in the EU for gender 
discrimination. This seems strange to some because it appears to allow women drivers as a  
group to be disadvantaged by rules designed in part to protect them. What has happened in 
practice is that the gap between men’s and women’s premiums in car insurance has continued 
to widen, because insurers have found alternative means of covert risk selection through 
proxies (e.g. occupation, size of car) that correlate well enough with gender without naming 
it. Such cases reveal something about how market persons are construed when apparently 
‘fixed’ aspects of personhood are disregarded, or even prohibited from being taken into 
account. In effect, ‘personalization’ now involves individual consumers being suspended in 
webs of data points (occupation, vehicle, income) without ever quite becoming a ‘group’ that 
could recognize itself as such, nor imagine itself as discriminated against (Moor and Lury 
2018). 
This links to a final – and relatively overlooked – aspect of datafication in markets, 
which is what we ought to be able to know about each other. Forms of price variation that 
appear ‘impersonal’, such as variable energy pricing, are interesting in part because while 
they make discriminations, they do so in ways that are hard to see because they are hidden 
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behind the proxy of individual choice and freely chosen behaviour. Choosing to use energy at 
a certain time of day is seen as a behaviour that is entirely separable from aspects of the 
person, even though it is constrained by ‘personal’ factors such as whether or not one is 
employed, whether a home worker, a stay-at-home parent and so on. People who cannot take 
advantage of lower prices during the day can never cohere into a group, and can never take 
collective action to improve their situation. In fact, markets regularly make such 
discriminations, and create groups and classifications in ways that are invisible to most of 
those involved. Michel Callon (2002) has pointed to the emergence of new market 
‘populations’ – in one case, ‘cruise goers who live in or near Paris’ – through market research 
practices, and observes that such categories could never have been anticipated by sociological 
theory. The point is that such groupings are often temporary, for short-term commercial use 
only, and, importantly, draw on aspects of the person that the individual to whom they 
‘belong’ may not be aware.  
What we have been suggesting, then, is that markets have always been involved in 
making persons: characterizing them, naming them, and endowing them with rights, or 
alternatively, obscuring them and making their membership of broader reference groups hard 
to see. At the same time, the contemporary datafication of markets – and the new 
arrangements that this enables – multiplies the possibilities for fine-grained distinctions. This 
does not generally require ‘deep’ knowledge of the self. The behavioural turn in marketing 
that has resulted from ubiquitous data collection means that markets produce persons – and 
thus engage in ‘personalization’ in at least one sense of the term – not just by ‘knowing’ 
them, but also by acting on them and incentivizing some behaviours while discouraging 
others. Furthermore, contemporary personalization practices produce connections between 
persons – chains of associations – that are sometimes visible and sometimes hidden. 
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Conclusion: Uncanny valley 
The history of insurance reveals a process of transforming and classifying objects and 
persons as risk. This has included treating some humans as objects or property and some non-
humans as persons. At a time when liberal conceptions of free, self-possessing persons were 
reconfiguring the relationship between personhood, status and property, life insurance 
contracts never simply mapped existing financial interests or social ties: they became part of 
the very stuff of personal relations, the material out of which complex social and economic 
ties were built. It is this disturbing intersection – between the tasks of underwriting property 
and underwriting individuals– that makes insurance arrangements so uncanny and often 
troubling. In insurtech the distribution of responsibility and risk across humans and non-
humans is subtly changing again, raising the prospect of insurable ‘response-ability’ that 
might be attributed to devices from automonous vehicles to a whole range of artificial 
intelligences from facial recognition to alcohol detection. 
 Our argument is that some claims made about the capacity of insurtech devices to 
personalize prices by using ‘personal’ data to calculate risk have not paid enough attention to 
contemporary and historical practices of risk classification. The extrapolation from the use of 
data derived from vehicle telematics to inform premiums to the role of fitness tracking 
devices in health and life insurance made or implied in journalistic and academic literatures 
glosses over the diversity and difficulty of price setting in these sectors (McFall, 2017). The 
use of incentives, rewards and premium reductions in companies like Oscar and Vitality 
occupy an ambiguous space between promotion and pricing. Such schemes may suggest 
prices are being set in accordance with tracked personal data, with all the potential for social 
discrimination that implies but there is an important distinction to be made between 
promotional offers that affect price and the use of data to calculate risk.   
 30 
If our question is who or what is being personalized in insurtech, then our cautious 
answer is that it is neither the human individual nor price. Insurance has always transformed 
bits of humans and non-humans into persons for particular legal and commercial purposes but 
has, in common with other market contexts, shown little interest in knowing or surveilling the 
whole person. All forms of personalization also involve the establishment of particular 
relations between a person and a reference group (Moor & Lury, 2018) that is underplayed in 
the debates about privacy and dataveillance. This relates to a more general issue with the 
under-specification of personalization as a concept. We have adopted a baseline definition 
that associates personalization with the use of data about an individual to tailor marketing 
strategies towards them. While there are plenty of examples of personalization in this sense a 
lack of clarity persists about what we mean by the person or the personal and therefore what 
its consequences might be.   
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2 Etymologically, the concept of risk tracks back from the Latin, risicum, to ‘a Greek navigation term “rhizikon, 
rhiza” which meant “root, stone, cut of the firm land” and was a metaphor for “difficulty to avoid in the sea.”’ 
There are always debates to be had about etymologies but still see 
http://research.dnv.com/skj/Papers/ETYMOLOGY-OF-RISK.pdf 
3 In this world, personalization is lauded as an almost unequivocally good thing. See Meyers and Hoyweghen for 
an overview of blog posts on Swiss Re’s Open Minds blog platform and the collection hosted at https://www.the-
digital-insurer.com conferences http://insuretechconnect.com.  The blogs of start-ups and incumbent accelerators, 
thinktanks and garages rehearse the same themes. Some are more cautious seeing personalization’s potential to 
‘poison the risk pool’ http://www.theactuary.com/features/2017/10/new-tech-big-data-are-they-good-for-
insurance/ https://ethicsandinsurance.info/2018/03/08/personalization/  
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12 Consider for instance the convoluted regulatory responses limiting the use of genetic data in life and health 
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13 Video of TV advertisement available at https://vimeo.com/254286749 
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17 See https://www.experian.co.uk/consumer/your-data/ 
18 Disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; 
sex; sexual orientation in the UK’s 2010 Equality Act 
19 Ralph (2017) quotes 850,000 digitally enabled policies in UK car insurance with quarterly growth between 6-8%  
https://www.ft.com/content/894c3f5e-786c-11e7-a3e8-60495fe6ca71; Deloitte (2016) identify the UK and Italy as 
European leaders in the field estimating these policies will make up around 25% of the market by 2020. 
20 See Arentz and Rehm (2016: 10) ‘programs based on wearables seem to be particularly suitable for risk selection, 
as they appear likely to attract those insured that sickness funds are interested in, the young, wealthy and therefore 
healthy individuals’. 
 
 
